Category Archives: Business Cycle Theory

Volatility and Interest Rates

Volatility is low across many asset classes.  If volatility is a measure of uncertainty, then this is a bit strange.  These seem to be some of the most confusing economic times in recent history, with ever present calls for market crashes while stock markets move up, bonds stay very high, and oil moves sideways.

Central bank policy has provided strength to most markets, as they are designed to do.  This has in effect reduced downside volatility.  Oil is trading at less than 20% implied volatility, well below historic levels, even as economic uncertainty is high.  Oil production in the U.S. is growing and should be putting downward pressure on oil, but prices have been moving sideways since 2011.  Why would $100 WTI, with rising supply and economic crashes always around the corner, be trading at <20% implied put side volatility?

At least part of the answer seems to involve central bank policy.  Low interest rates have sent money out to non-traditional markets in search of yield.  Commodities like oil benefit from this.  Low interest rates also incentivize oil producers to keep oil in the ground.  If their option is to put their proceeds from oil sales into low to negative real rate paying treasuries, then why not wait?  Lastly, the money used by central banks to buy the bonds that keep interest rates low needs a home.  The new money is a wealth transfer from savers to the receivers of the new money, so there is a constant flow of real, not nominal, savings to the bondholders.  They will be looking for somewhere to invest the money.  These three factors, put in place because of the uncertainty the world faces, have led to the paradox of lower volatility in the face of greater uncertainty.

Below is a chart showing the Goldman Sachs commodity index with real 6 month interest rates:

image001

 

International Investment and Time Preference Mismatching

The mismatch between interest rates and time preferences is well known during times of central bank interest rate manipulation like we have today.  But less understood is the mismatch between time preferences among developed and developing countries.

As societies become wealthier, they begin to have higher savings rates.  The higher savings rates imply a lower time preference, meaning that they are willing to forgo consumption today for greater consumption later.  Time preference is the basis of interest rates.  Lower time preference for consumption leads to greater savings, which leads to more capital available to be lent and lower interest rates.

This all works out because a sufficient amount of capital available for, say, two year loans implies that in two years, when the project for which money is borrowed is completed and its products are being offered for sale, the buying power will be there to purchase the products.  The only question is whether or not the entrepreneur calculated consumer tastes correctly.

But does this work in the world of international capital flows?  Money saved in a wealthy, low time preference country that is invested in a poor, high time preference country could be at risk of a mismatch between the investment and its future products and the ability of the local citizens to purchase those products.  Especially in times like these, when central banks have pushed interest rates to very low levels, and investors are searching for creative ways to earn returns, the danger of mistaking rising foreign asset prices for good investment opportunities due to time preference mismatching seems great.

Garrison’s “Time and Money”, Chapter 3 Overview

The basic outline of Austrian macroeconomics and business cycle theory described above will now be elaborated.  A three part analysis, using the loanable funds market, the production possibilities frontier, and the Hayekian triangle to model the intertemporal production structure, will be employed to this end.

Capital Based Macroeconomics

Austrian macroeconomic theory is based on the market process, as the result of individual actions, in the context of the intertemporal capital structure.  Focusing on the intertemporal nature of capital allows this theory to capture the two pervasive elements in macroeconomics, time and money, where other theories can’t.  In so doing, it rejects the Keynesian theoretical division between macroeconomics and the economics of growth.  Mainstream macroeconomics studies economy-wide disequilibria with a focus on aggregates in a short term setting.  Growth theory studies a growing capital stock and its consequences in the long term.  Austrian macroeconomics, being capital based, combines the study of the short term macro, cyclical changes in the economy with the long run secular economic expansion due to a growth in capital.

This capital based approach has three integrated elements:  the market for loanable funds, the production possibilities frontier, and the intertemporal structure of production, where the market process is guided by the attempted match, by entrepreneurs, between consumer preferences and production.

The Loanable Funds Market

Austrian theory defines a loanable funds market with some modifications.  Consumer lending is netted out on the supply side.  The supply and demand of loanable funds is broadened to include retained earnings, which are simply a fund with which a business lends to and borrows from itself.  The purchase of equities, which in this context are closely related to debt instruments, is considered a form of saving.

The supply of loanable funds is defined as total income not spent on consumer goods, but instead used to earn interest or dividends.  In other words, investable resources.  Loanable funds are used to invest in the means of production, not in financial instruments.  Demand for these funds reflects businesses’ desires to pay for inputs now in order to sell output later.  Supply represents that part of income foregone by consumers for the consumption of goods now in order to save for more consumption later.  The supply/demand equilibrium coordinates these actions.

The investment of loanable funds brings the loan rates and the implicit interest rates among the various stages of production in line.  As more investment goes to those stages with temporarily higher returns, those stages are brought in line with the implicit rates in all other stages and the loan rate, so all rates tend to equalize.  The loan rate includes the expected return.  In this way it differs from the pure rate of interest, which is a reflection of societal time preferences.

Keynesian macroeconomics hints at psychological explanations for economic fluctuations.  Business confidence is described as the “waxing and waning of animal spirits”.  The other side of the coin from business confidence is the saver’s “liquidity preference”.  Austrian theory eschews these psychological explanations and instead focuses on economics.  Business confidence is assumed to be usually stable, and an economic explanation for expected losses from intertemporal discoordination is desired.  For savers, the concept of liquidity preference is discarded in favor of an economic explanation of lender’s risk, which, as with business confidence, is assumed to be usually stable.

As alluded to above, mainstream macro has two conflicting theoretical constructs:  one for short run equilibrium/disequilibrium and another for long run economic capital accumulation and growth.  The idea of saving as not consuming is important for the short run consumption-based theory.  Saving and decreased consumption are assumed to be permanent by businesses in the short run theory.  The paradox of thrift enters the picture here as savings won’t be fully borrowed for investment in production due to business pessimism.  For Keynesians especially, what appears to be disequilibrium is really an equilibrium with unemployment and is the normal course of things.  The long run theory, however, views saving and investment as the foundations of growth.

Austrian theory falls somewhere in between these two constructions.  People don’t just save; they save for the purpose of consuming more later.  They accumulate purchasing power for later use.  There is, of course, risk and uncertainty inherent in future demand for consumption goods.  The entrepreneur takes on this risk as he tries to earn a profit from the coordination of current saving and future demand.  The entrepreneur, then, is crucial in the Austrian theory.

The Production Possibilities Frontier

The Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF) can be used to show the tradeoff between consumption (C) and investment (I), rather than the tradeoff between consumption and capital goods as is normally done.  This modified use of the PPF captures gross investment, including capital maintenance and capital expansion.  The production of capital goods is equal to investment in any given period.  A stationary economy, with no growth and no contraction, has gross investment at a level only to maintain capital.

A PPF describing a mixed economy must also capture government spending (G) and taxation (T).  Conventional, Keynesian-based, macroeconomics defines total expenditure (E) as C + I + G.  In the Keynesian framework, consumption is stable, investment is unstable, and government spending is a stabilizing force.  Consumption depends on net income, but investment and government spending do not.  Investment has a mind of its own, so to speak, so Keynesian policy calls for G to counteract changes in I to allow for stable growth.

The particular design of the tax system and the types of government spending, whether that money goes to domestic investment or foreign military activities or so forth, will affect the shape of the PPF and the specific point of the PPF an economy will find itself.  Of course, governments often spend more than they bring in and finance the difference with debt.  This borrowing increases the demand for loanable funds, and government deficits, Gd, are added to investment, I, on the PPF’s horizontal axis.  Gd is defined as G – T.

In a private economy or an economy with G = T, the net PPF shows the sustainable combinations of C and I and assumes full resource employment.  Points inside the PPF have unemployment of labor (L) and resources.  This is considered the normal state of affairs in a private economy by Keynesians, where scarcity will not impede growth and C and I can move in the same direction.  In fact, Keynes’ General Theory includes points inside the PPF, and the theory considers points on the PPF to represent a special case, where Classical theory describes the economy well.

Representing the Intertemporal Structure of Production

Capital-based macroeconomics can make use of the Hayekian triangle to make a simple illustration of both the value added between production stages and the time dimension of the capital structure.  The horizontal leg of the triangle is production time, the vertical leg is the value of output, and the slope of the hypotenuse represents value added between stages.  The simplest, point input/point output, case, such as putting a food in storage before selling the more valuable aged product, contains one stage.  The triangle can be divided vertically to represent different production stages.  Consumption of consumer durables can be represented by another triangle back to back with the first, where the slope of its hypotenuse represents consumption through time.

The Macroeconomics of Capital Structure

Austrian macroeconomics combines the three part analysis described above.  The interest rate and the return on capital tend toward each other, so the slope of the Hayekian triangle and the interest rate normally move in the same direction in the absence of government spending and borrowing and other economic interventions.  The location of the economy described by the three part analysis on the PPF gives us that economy’s “natural” rate of employment, and the clearing rate of our loanable funds market gives us the “natural” rate of interest.

The supply and demand of money is not explicitly represented in this analysis, so transaction demand and speculative demand for money are not a part of Austrian macroeconomics.  The model of the economy, absent government intervention, is a system where money simply facilitates trade and is not a source of disequilibrium.  As such it is “pure” theory, and not monetary theory.  Finally, this method does not track the absolute price level, and instead focused on relative prices as the more important factor in the intertemporal coordination of production.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT), on the other hand, treats money as a “loose joint”, where policy-induced money supply and interest rate changes cause economic disequilibria.  As such, ABCT is a monetary theory.  Keynesians consider the Real Balance Effect, where an increase in money’s purchasing power causes increased consumption, the only possible, though highly unlikely, market solution to economic depression.  Austrian macroeconomics counters by using the Capital Allocation Effect, where movements in relative prices within the capital structure allow for intertemporal resource allocation and societal consumption preferences to be in line without idle labor or resources.  Also unlike Keynesian macroeconomics, Austrian macro does not include “the” labor market.  Instead, many labor and resource markets are represented, with labor and resources moving between different stages as needed.

Macroeconomics of Secular Growth

A static economy is easily applied using the three part analysis of the PPF, the loanable funds market, and the Hayekian triangle, but secular growth is the more general case.  During growth, we have outward shifts of the PPF.  At the same time, societal time preferences might not have changed, so the interest rate can remain the same, and with it the slope of the Hayekian triangle, as the supply of and demand for loans both increase.  Historically, though, increases in wealth generally bring decreased time preferences, so the supply of loanable funds will outpace their demand, causing interest rates to fall.  Put another way, consumption increases at a slower rate than income since saving and investment also increase with rising income.

The equation of exchange, MV = PQ, where Q = C + I, implies that the general price level declines as consumption and investment increase.  Secular growth will bring lowered prices and wages in the sectors experiencing the growth with a given money supply and velocity.  This growth-based deflation does not bring disequilibrium, unlike deflation caused by changes in the supply and demand for money.  Growth brings greater saving and investment, which allows for a lengthening of the production structure and an eventual fall in the prices of consumer goods.

The Business Cycle

Credit Expansion and Inflation1

The money supply is unstable because governments can create fiat money at will and banks create uncovered money substitutes, meaning banks keep less than 100% reserves.  Those who receive the new money first, before the PPM has adjusted to the new supply, benefit.  They can trade over-valued money for goods until the new supply/demand equilibrium is reached.  People living on savings or a fixed income are hurt the worst as their costs rise but their nominal wealth remains constant.  Their real share of the money supply decreases.

Bank credit expansion, extending loans not backed by 100% reserves, is, like the creation of fiat money, a form of wealth redistribution.  Credit expansion can have worse consequences than money creation, and the problems often appear far after the act.  The benefits, however, quickly become manifest.

Inflation, including both credit expansion and fiat money creation, produce winners and losers as a new PPM equilibrium is established, depending on when each person receives the new money.  Permanent winners and losers are also created by the new equilibrium.  Each person has a unique spending pattern.  The uneven distribution of the new money, both in space and time, will cause permanent changes in relative goods prices.  This will cause permanent changes in many individuals’ consumption/investment proportions, and some will have to either buy goods which are relatively more expensive or will change their goods purchased.

Credit expansion lowers the loan rate of interest as more savings appear to be available to borrow.  This would seem to reflect a lowering of societal time preferences.  In fact, time preferences have not changed, and the loan rate and natural rate diverge.  The inflationary credit expansion has negative consequences apart from setting off the business cycle, which will be described below.  Savings, which appear to have grown, are actually hurt as savers, creditors, are repaid in devalued money.  Inflation causes capital consumption as businesses believe profits have risen and under-invest in terms of the new PPM.  These profits will appear to have risen most in the most capital-intensive businesses, since the greatest proportion of investment has been done under the old PPM but the profits appear in inflated money.  Real profits remain unchanged, but nominal profits, appearing high, attract new investment into these sectors.  Apart from investing in production above demand, investment is diverted from production which is demanded by society.  This is not understood at the time, which leads to the next step in the development of the business cycle.

Saving, Investment, and Interest Rates in the Free Market

In the free market, as the investment to consumption ratio goes up due to lowered time preferences, the prices of consumer goods fall and producer goods rise.  Goods of the lowest orders fall the most and those of the highest orders rise the most.  The structure of production is lengthened and efficiency increases as investment flows to the higher stages of production, along with labor and non-specific factors of production.  The lengthening of the production process entails more stages of production.  At the same time, the price differentials between these stages narrow.  A lower return per stage is earned in more stages of production.  This means that the natural rate of interest decreases, and this leads to a decrease in the loan rate as well.

This increase in investment, made possible by actual lowered societal time preferences and the resultant increase in available savings on the loan market, allows for a more efficient production process.  This efficiency eventually pays off in the form of more and cheaper consumer goods on the market.  Everyone’s real income increases.

There is no room for a business cycle to develop in the case just described.  Investment has been coordinated by capitalists and entrepreneurs with the information coming from the loan market.  This is turn has been a reflection of the natural rate of interest and lowered societal time preferences.  Credit expansion, while providing similar signals at first, leads to a very different scenario.

The Start of the Business Cycle

As banks extend loans not backed by reserves, the money supply increases and interest rates fall.  This fall is not, however, due to a lowering of societal time preferences.  Businesses borrow at the new, lower rates and buy capital goods and factors of production.  These resources are put to use in the higher stages of production, narrowing the price differentials between stages.  As in the first case, prices rise the most in the highest stages of production.  The difference now is that the lower interest rate which has led to the increased investment has not been matched by lower time preferences and higher savings.  Total money income was unchanged in the first case as the higher spending on the higher stages of production was offset by lower spending in the lower stages.  Also, the lengthened production structure was offset by the narrowed price differentials between stages.  Here, however, total money income increases as newly created money enters the production structure.  The lengthened production structure is not accompanied by a narrowing of the price differentials between stages because spending on consumer goods has not decreased and caused a fall in the prices of lower order goods.

The receivers of the newly created money allocate their spending based on their time preferences.  Businesses have over-invested in the higher stages of production and under-invested in the lower stages.  They were misled by the lower interest rates.  Societal time preferences and the new investments don’t match.  The savings required for sustaining the new production structure are not actually there.  The consumption/investment allocations of the public remain unchanged from where they were before the credit expansion, and the loan rate of interest is pulled back up toward the natural rate.

The prices of the goods used in the higher stages fall and the goods used in the lower stages rise back towards their levels seen before the credit expansion as the consumer demand for the new production structure is seen to not exist.  Time preferences are actually higher than the credit expansion led borrowers to believe.  The savings were never really there.  The credit expansion did not increase capital investment, it simply shifted investment to a longer production structure which was not matched by societal preferences.  The newly created money simply transferred purchasing power to the borrowers from everyone else.  The investment was financed via wealth transfer, not real, voluntary savings.

To summarize, consumers, who eventually receive the newly created money, spend according to their time preferences, which are higher than the credit expansion loan rates would make them appear.  Consumer goods prices rise as the new money is spent purchasing them, and the producer goods begin to fall as soon as there are no new loans based on credit expansion to bid them up.  The old spreads between higher and lower order goods return, and the new investment is seen to be a mistake.  Prices have risen for all goods as the PPM has decreased, but the relative prices return to pre-inflation levels, with some changes as described in the previous section on the PPM.  Societal time preference has also been altered due to the change in the PPM, but the new equilibrium approaches the old.  The business cycle elucidates the nature of the relation between the money supply and interest rates and how their manipulation affects the economy.  An increase in the money supply through credit expansion cannot permanently lower interest rates; it can only do so temporarily and at the cost of economic distortion.

Some Other Effects of the Credit Expansion

The downturn and depression phase of the cycle is really the beginning of the recovery from the harm caused during the boom.  Any actions that government may take to lessen the depression’s effects would only lead to its prolongation.  Only further credit expansion can prolong the boom period, and the further it is prolonged, the worse its effects will be.  The longer the credit expansion phase lasts, the worse the economic distortion and the resulting correction will be.  Scarce resources are misdirected during the boom, and society becomes poorer, though the opposite seems true at the time.

The expanding money supply and decreasing PPM will lower the demand to hold money, and people will begin buying goods in anticipation of continued rising prices.  If the dishoarded money flows to higher order goods, then profits will be lowered as the differentials between higher and lower stages become smaller.  This will further lower the loan rate below the natural rate, and the correction phase will be worse.

Deflation often occurs during the correction as credit contraction sets in.  This will allow for prices between goods of different orders to widen and return to levels in accordance with the natural rate of interest.  But whereas during the boom phase businesses were fooled by inflation into believing their profits were higher than they actually were, the same accounting error leads them to believe that profits are lower than they really are during deflation.  This will lead to more saving than would otherwise occur, which will help lessen the effects of the capital consumption that happened during the inflationary period.

1.  See Chapter 12, Section 11 in Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State.

Summary of Human Action, Chapter 31

Under the gold standard and the gold exchange standard, the possibility of redemption in gold kept exchange rates stable and foreign trade was unaffected by shifting currency values (usually brought about by devaluations).  Gold or gold-backed money flowed amongst countries and kept prices and balances of payments moving towards equilibrium.

This system, from the governments’ points of view, was too restrictive, and they moved to a flexible exchange rate standard.  When unemployment began to be a permanent part of the world’s economies, and the unions had gained enough political power that they could refuse a reduction in nominal wages, governments resorted to currency devaluation as a way to lower real wages and decrease unemployment.  This would also cause commodity prices to rise, favor debtors at the expense of creditors, and increase exports while decreasing imports, at least until goods prices rose.  Governments, however, tried to hide their true goals with talk of domestic and foreign price level equilibrium and lowering domestic costs of production (which would come about through lower real wages and decreased real business debt).

Unfortunately for the economic planners and interventionists, the effects of devaluation are only temporary, as other countries will catch on and devalue their currencies also.  A race to the bottom ensues, while more devaluations become necessary since the supposedly beneficial effects to foreign trade and the balance of payments are only felt during the time between the devaluation and change in the exchange rate and the later adjustment of domestic prices and wages.

The citizens in the devaluing country are getting less and paying more in this time interval, and must restrict consumption.  On the other hand, those who borrowed money for real estate or business or own stock in indebted companies benefit from the ability to pay loans in devalued currency.  This of course comes at the expense of those who own bonds, insurance policies, or who hold money.

Under a gold standard, domestic money market rates are tied to international rates through redemption and the consequent stability among currencies.  A flexible rate system, however, allows governments to adjust domestic rates to fit current political objectives.  Interest rates are not a monetary phenomenon, they are a real economy and time preference phenomenon, and cannot be held down forever without severe distortions in the production structure, making the economy susceptible to the business cycle.

Finally, the main reason for the devaluations in the first place, the reduction of real wages, begins to be anticipated by the unions, who demand real wage increases instead.  The intervention’s objectives are not met, wealth has been redistributed, and the economy is left distorted.

Credit Expansion

Fiduciary media is not the product of government, but of private banking, policy, as banks began keeping less than 100% reserves on hand and banknotes became fiduciary media.  For example, checking accounts backed by less than 100% reserves will increase the money supply without the necessity of increasing base money.

Government has adopted credit expansion as its main tool for controlling the market economy.  With this tool the government attempts to lessen the scarcity of capital, to lower interest rates below market levels, to finance deficit spending, and re-direct wealth to favored groups.

If interest rates are lowered without a credit expansion, a boom will not be created.

The objective of credit expansion is to benefit some groups at the expense of others.  Some policies attempt to direct credit to specific groups like the producers of capital or consumer goods or to the housing sector, but all policies of credit expansion will lead to an increase in the stock market and then to an increase in investment in fixed capital through the false signals coming from the stock market.

Under the gold standard, a country that expanded credit faster than its trading partners would bring upon itself a drain of its gold stocks and its foreign reserves as holders of its currency would demand gold or stronger currencies in exchange for its over-valued money.  If the government believes that this drain is the result of an unfavorable balance of payments, it might seek to limit demand for its reserves by enacting policies such as tariffs which lessen demand for imports.  This will lead to a drop in exports, however, as locals use the domestic currency on domestics goods instead, causing a rise in domestic prices and a decrease in exports.

The country would then have to restrict credit in order to stop the outflow of reserves, causing a recession or depression.  Businesses in other countries would defensively increase borrowing in the face of this downturn, causing their governments to restrict credit to avoid a drain of their reserves, leading to an international recession.

Under the flexible rate system, governments are able to devalue their currencies instead of restricting credit.

Money and Interest

In a barter economy with no money, it is easy to see how value and purchasing power come about:  a person must produce or acquire something, whether a good or service, that someone else would want to exchange another good or service for.  This is explained by Say’s Law.

Interest is evident in a barter economy as the ratio of current goods demanded to future goods.  This is the result of time preference, and shows that interest is not a monetary phenomenon but is the result of scarcity both in goods and time.

The situation is complicated by the use of commodity money in an economy, and even more so when fiat money is used that is not restricted in quantity by anything but government discretion.

What Kind of Good is Money?1

Is money a production or consumption good?  The loss or gain of a production or consumption good makes society worse or better off than before, but an increase or decrease in the supply of money cannot change society’s welfare, since it will only decrease or increase the purchasing power of existing money and will leave the overall value of all money unchanged.

No part of production or consumption is dependent on money, despite the fact that money greatly increases the ease of exchange.  The laws governing production and consumption goods are different than those governing money; they share only the basic laws of value.  Economic goods should therefore be divided into means of production, objects of consumption, and media of exchange.  These definitions will help to answer the question of whether or not money is capital, and help to elucidate the relation between the equilibrium (which is determined only by individuals’ time preferences) and money rates of interest.

What is the connection between private capital and money?  Private capital is the aggregate of products that are used to acquire other goods.  Money on loan bears interest, but produces nothing per se otherwise.  The borrower of money, however, exchanges it for economic goods, as do other holders of money.  Money is then part of private capital insofar as it is used as a means to obtain other capital goods.

Social capital is the aggregate of goods intended for use in further production, and money cannot be included since it is not a productive good.  The fact that the rate of interest is determined by the quantity of economic goods and not the quantity of money means that money is not a productive good.

Commodity Money2

The differences in money and commodities become obvious when looking at money’s objective exchange value, or purchasing power.  While money ultimately derives its value from the subjective valuations of people, as do all commodities, its subjective value is strongly affected by its objective exchange value, and is not so strongly affected by its objective use value and its place in the hierarchy of human needs as other goods are.

Subjective use and exchange values coincide in money since both are derived from its objective exchange value and money has no other use than in obtaining other economic goods.  The subjective use-values of commodities must be taken for granted and left to the psychology of each individual, but the analysis of money begins where the analysis of commodities stops, since money has no subjective value apart from its exchange value, and this comes from the subjective valuations of the goods for which money can be exchanged.  It is important to note that the exchange value discussed here, and which is derived from the individual subjective values placed on them, is not the same as the value theory of Smith and Ricardo and the Classical School, which took value in exchange as the starting point and which is derived from labor cost or cost of production (Marx used Smith’s labor theory of value to show the exploitation of the workers).

The price of money then is the amount of goods which money can be exchanged for.  Commodity values are explained by subjective use-value, but money only has value insofar as it can be exchanged for goods, and therefore has an objective exchange value, or price.  The objective and subjective values of money are linked.

Producers of goods focus on the exchange values of goods rather than on their use-values, which are subjective.  It is, however, the sum of the use-values placed on goods by all people in the market for those goods which determines the exchange values of those goods.

Money, however, cannot be traced back to any underlying aggregate use-values which are not tied to its own objective value which is in turn tied to the values of all the goods for which the money can be exchanged.

It was thought that the value of money depended on the economic use of the material of which it was made, but this cannot account for fiat money or credit money.  Monetary theory must remove all determinants of value which are tied to the money’s material, since these determinants make money indistinguishable from commodities.  Only the objective exchange value is important in monetary theory, as the economic value of its material can be explained by the standard tools of economics.

What gives money its value?  Fundamentally, it is the fact that market participants accept it as a medium of exchange; without this its value would collapse.  But given its acceptance, it has value as a medium through which the value of labor and goods are transferred between people.  A currency increases in value when more labor is undertaken in exchange for that currency and more goods denominated in that currency are traded.  An example is the desire of the US government to continue the pricing of international crude oil trading in dollars.  A less known example is the benefit to the dollar from having most illegal drugs priced in dollars worldwide.  Both of these increase the demand for dollars and therefore its value.  Holding supply constant for a currency, a greater amount of economic activity denominated in that currency increases its value.

Fiat Money

If the creator of the fiat currency, the government, decides to create more, it can essentially steal a proportion of the stored economic activity in that currency.  It can use the new money at the current value, before its market value decreases due to the increased supply.  Those connected to the government, who receive the money first, also benefit, as does everyone, with decreasing benefit, who acquires the money before it attains its new price based on the new supply.  This is the primary benefit of fiat currencies to governments and their partners.

The Demand for Money3

The demand for money is comprised of exchange demand and reservation demand, which gives the holder of reserves optionality.  Speculative demand exists when the PPM is expected to change.  The increase or decrease of money held hastens the change in the PPM to its expected value.

A growing economy will experience a long run increase in the demand to hold money as more exchanges and investments are made available.  Growing economies also develop clearing and credit mechanisms, which decrease the demand to hold money.

An individual’s time preference is shown in his allocation of money to consumption, investment, or to increasing his cash balance.  The proportion of money to consumption versus investment is a reflection of time preference.  An addition from income to the cash balance, or increased hoarding of cash, need not change the proportion devoted to consumption versus investment and therefore does not necessarily alter time preference or the rate of interest.  A change in the demand for money leads to a change in the PPM, while a change in time preference leads to a change in interest rates.

Interest as Time Preference4

A proper understanding of the nature of interest rates is fundamental to understanding the business cycle, which is itself caused by a divergence between the real and loan rates of interest.  This divergence, caused by an expansion of credit not backed by real savings, distorts the information provided by interest rates to entrepreneurs.  The phenomenon of interest results from the real economy as a result of time preference, which causes, all else equal, a higher price for goods now than in the future.  The pure rate of interest is the difference in value between present goods and future goods.  In the production process, interest is calculated as the difference in the final good and the sum of the factors of production, which are discounted to the final goods price due to time preference.  Productivity theories of interest ascribed the earning of interest to the productivity of the various factors of production.  In actuality, the prices of the capital goods are based on their productivity, but the discount of their prices to the final goods they help produce is due to time preference and is the pure rate of interest.

The classical economists called profit, or interest, the return to capital, rent the return to land, and wages the return to labor, but all three are really the result of time preference and their prices are calculated from their discounted products.  For example, without time preference and discounting, productive land prices would be infinite.

The pure rate of interest explains why shorter, less productive methods of production might be chosen over longer, more productive techniques.  Time preference often proves a stronger force than achieving more production per input.

Contrary to some theories, interest is not determined by the supply of and demand for capital goods on the market, but determines them, along with how much of the current stock of capital goods will be saved or consumed.  Interest does not cause saving, but aggregates the various individual time preferences of market participants and signals to borrowers a hurdle rate with which to analyze potential projects, and to potential savers what are the opportunity costs of consumption.  So the interest rate, as a manifestation of the goods economy and individual time preferences, serves as a signal from the real economy to the money loan market and brings its interest rates in line with the aggregated time preferences of a society.

Interest in a Monetary Economy5

The natural rate of interest is the market rate of return to economic production, also known as the marginal efficiency of capital.  The loan rate is simply a reflection of the natural rate and depends on the various expectations and decisions which economic actors make on the loan markets, stock markets, and other financial markets.

The natural rate is composed of the pure rate, which is due to time preference; the rates of return specific to various lines of production, which differ in risk, etc.; a purchasing power component which corrects for changes in the PPM during the time lag in the production process; and a terms of trade component due to the non-neutrality of money and the resulting different speeds of price change between factors of production and final goods.  Only the pure rate would exist in a world without uncertainty.

The relationship between interest rate changes and price changes will be analyzed in two parts:  first under the assumption of neutral money, and then allowing for non-neutrality of money.

A rise or fall in prices, meaning a fall or rise in the PPM, will cause nominal and real returns to deviate due to the time lag between the purchase of the factors of production and the sale of the final product.  In a world of rising prices, rates of return will appear higher than they are.  The decrease in the PPM will show that the apparent rise in profits was illusory.  Because of this deviation between the nominal and real return, the natural rate of interest contains a purchasing power component which corrects for actual changes in the PPM during the production process.  The purchasing power component would not exist if changes in the PPM were fully anticipated since market activity would quickly align the current PPM with the anticipated future PPM.

Changes in the PPM are never neutral, meaning they affect different goods differently.  The changes alter the hypothetical array of goods which measures the PPM.  Because of this, factors of production and final goods change at different speeds when the PPM changes and different factors change at different speeds, which changes the terms of trade in a production process.  When product prices rise faster than factor prices, a positive terms of trade component exists in the natural rate of interest and will be reflected in the loan rate.

Changes in the PPM6

A change in the money relation, which is the demand for and supply of money, is non-neutral, meaning, for example, that a doubling of the supply of money will not result in a doubling of all prices.  The new equilibrium between the money relation and goods will be different than the old equilibrium, apart from higher prices, and the path to that new equilibrium will not be predictable.  The relative prices between goods will also be changed.  Some people will gain and some people will lose.  Those whose selling prices rise faster than their buying prices will gain, as will those who receive the new money before goods prices have adjusted to the new money relation.  The new money will enter the economy at some points and will diffuse throughout the economy until individual prices have adjusted and a new equilibrium has been reached.

There is no gain in social utility from the new money relation resulting from a doubling of the money supply, only a transfer of some peoples’ PPM to others.  There are some who gain and some who lose, and there is a possibly destabilizing path to a new equilibrium.  Time preferences could also be changed since the winners will have different preferences than the losers.

The Money Supply and Goods Prices7

The exchange demand for goods is equal to the supply of money minus the reservation demand for money.  The total demand for goods is equal to the supply of money minus the reservation demand for money plus the reservation demand for all goods.  These are general and obvious relations, and it can be seen that any change in the money supply will have unpredictable consequences for the demand for any particular goods.

The exchange demand for money is equal to the supply of all goods minus the reservation demand for all goods.  All of these relations are pointing to the same thing, which is the PPM.  A rise in the supply of goods or the reservation demand for money cause the PPM to increase and a rise in the stock of money or the reservation demand for goods cause the PPM to decrease.  An increase in demand for any particular good will cause a decrease in demand for one or more other goods absent a decrease in the reservation demand for money.  A change in any specific demand for a good will not change the PPM if there is no change in the reservation demand for money.

PPM Stabilization8

All economic laws are qualitative.  Mathematical descriptions of economic laws obscure the fact that there are no constants in human action.  Mathematics relies on simplifications which cannot describe the level of uncertainty in the ever-changing magnitudes and correlations inherent in human economic activity.  For this reason the quantitative methods used to stabilize or control the PPM are dubious and often harmful.  These actions rely on indices which are supposed to measure a typical basket of goods available to the average consumer.  This average consumer, however, has constantly changing value scales and utilities of money and goods.  The attempt to stabilize the PPM through controlling the money supply will alter each individual’s value scales and will change the relative utilities of goods and the utility of money.  The PPM can and should change as the utility of money relative to each available good changes.  A stable PPM is actually destabilizing as it masks the natural changes taking place between money and each good and between the relative prices of all goods.  Individuals holding or spending money is socially useful as it is a reflection of individual value scales.  A fluctuating PPM is a natural result and reflection of this utility.  Useful economic information is distorted.  This fact will take on more importance when business cycles are studied.

1.  See Chapter 5 of Mises’ Theory of Money and Credit.

2.  See Chapter 7 of Mises’ Theory of Money and Credit.

3.  See Chapter 17 of Mises’ Human Action and Chapter 11 of Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State.

4.  See Chapter 19 of Mises’ Human Action.

5.  See Chapter 6 in Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State.

6.  See Chapter 11, Section 7 in Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State.

7.  See Chapter 11, Section 8 in Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State.

8.  See Chapter 11, Section 14 in Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State.

Mexican Fiscal and Monetary History

Mexico maintained a fixed exchange rate of 12.50 pesos to the dollar until 1976.  To accomplish this, the Banco de Mexico actively intervened in the currency market to keep the peso at the desired exchange rate.  The central bank would use its foreign currency reserves, usually dollars, to buy pesos.  This decreases the supply of pesos on the market and increases the supply of dollars, making pesos more valuable relative to the dollar.  A main reason for this is to maintain the purchasing power of the peso in order to keep imports affordable.
On the other hand, if the peso is perceived to be overvalued, the bank will sell pesos in exchange for dollars, driving the value of the peso down.  Mexican exports will be more attractive with a weaker peso.
Despite continued economic growth in Mexico in the 1970s, budget deficits and inflation were rising, and deficits were financed through foreign debt.  A precursor of problems to come, the peso was devalued by 56% in 1976 and taken off its fixed exchange rate in favor of a managed floating rate.  In the managed floating rate system, the peso would be allowed to move within a band which would be enforced with central bank intervention.
The Mexican government, expecting increasing oil revenues from high world prices, increased borrowing in dollars.  However, oil prices plummeted in the early 1980s, greatly reducing revenues and dollar inflows.  Declining international economic conditions decreased demand for Mexico’s primary exports.  Foreign capital, made nervous by the growing debt, began to leave Mexico, putting downward pressure on the now overvalued peso.  These dollars had been used to service the growing Mexican debt, and in their absence the government announced in 1982 that it could not service its debt on billions of dollars of loans.
Neoclassical economists developed the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments (MABOP) theory to explain the cycle indebted Latin American countries found themselves in during the 1970s and 1980s.  According to MABOP, budget deficits contribute to inflation since it is known they will eventually be monetized.  Devaluations of a currency do not keep pace with inflation, leading to overvalued exchange rates.  Exports fall while imports rise, leading to a trade deficit and capital flight.  Governments must borrow to finance the balance of payments deficit, which leads to high interest payments.  Each step of the cycle makes the next step worse and the cycle is perpetuated until the government must capitulate and devalue the currency.
Miguel de la Madrid came into office in 1982, inheriting an economy in crisis and in serious need of reform after years of government intervention.  The first order of business was to tackle the near 100% inflation rate.  The government was able to slow inflation to around 65% by 1985 through spending cuts and tighter monetary policy, but at the cost of a 13% decrease in GDP over the same period.  Another top priority was government debt reduction, which resulted in net transfers through debt payments to foreign creditors of 6% of GDP between 1982 and 1985.
Despite publicly claiming to control inflation, the government was incentivized to inflate the money supply through the existence of an “inflation tax”, which is the wealth transfer from holders of cash to the spender of newly created money, in this case the government.  Money creation was such that this course of action equated to up to 8% of GDP between 1983 and 1985.  By 1986, inflation had returned to its 1982 level of near 100%.
The Mexican government was still heavily involved in the economy, controlling the banking sector and limiting foreigners’ ability to invest in Mexican businesses.  Government debt and controls had smothered the economy, causing a drop in per capita income in the 1980s almost as large as that seen in the Depression.  Clearly, a freeing of the economy through free market policies was in order.
In 1987 and 1988, the Mexican government signed two agreements with the business, labor, and agriculture sectors popularly called the Pacto, which through its various incarnations has attempted to curb expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, control prices and wages, renegotiate debt, deregulate markets, and privatize state-owned businesses.
The Mexican public sector owned 1,155 businesses in 1982, and by 1994 940 of those were divested.  The tax system was simplified, rates were decreased, tax collection and tax revenue increased, and government spending and fiscal deficits fell.  The government also implemented financial and trade liberalization.  The elimination of bank reserve requirements and mandatory financing of public sector businesses removed a heavy burden from private finance and allowed capital to flow to more productive areas in the economy.  Banks were privatized, capital controls were lifted, and foreign capital was allowed greater access to Mexican investment.  Trade liberalization came in the form of reduced import licensing and tariffs, and was codified with the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 (Gould, 1995).
Mexico’s economic liberalization programs and successful foreign debt renegotiation in 1990 attracted capital inflows, which were made more attractive by the low interest rates seen at the time in the U.S.  The financial sector’s unburdening resulted in rapid credit expansion, made possible by a large reduction in public debt and a rise in the Mexican stock market and real estate prices.  Expectations of economic growth and an abundance of foreign and domestic capital led to decreased lending standards which, when faced with an economic slowdown in 1993, resulted in a rapidly increasing number of non-performing loans on the books of Mexican banks.
Local Mexican commercial banks increased credit to the private sector by an average of 25% per year from 1988 to 1994.  During this same period, credit card debt rose 31% per year and mortgage loans rose 47% per year (Gil-Diaz, 1998).  This local credit expansion combined with large foreign capital inflows led to rising aggregate demand within Mexico and a strengthening peso which could only lead to a current account deficit.  Unfortunately, the Pacto contained within it a commitment to keep the exchange rate within a narrow band that was not in harmony with the current heated economic conditions.
With foreign money spurning low U.S. interest rates in favor of higher Mexican rates, largely in the form of short term capital, money flowed into Mexican markets.  The Banco de Mexico acquired an increasing supply of dollar reserves and was able to provide the needed pesos to the market.
Predictably in an environment inundated with foreign capital and easy credit, leveraged investment began to flow to less productive projects chasing returns, increasing the fragility of the economy and leaving it vulnerable to changing international investment conditions, which occurred when U.S. interest rates rose, decreasing the demand for peso denominated investments and exposing the multitude of bad loans on the books of Mexican banks (Kaplan, 1998).  As investors began to demand dollars in exchange for pesos at the managed exchange rate, Mexico’s foreign reserves began to shrink to the point that peso devaluation became necessary.  The peso/dollar exchange rate went first from 3 to 3.5 pesos to the dollar, with the managed currency band still in effect.  This move did not end speculative pressure on the peso, and the government increased the peso’s band.  With pressure mounting, the government was forced to capitulate totally on December 22, 1994 by removing the peso’s managed float and allowing the currency to move freely against the dollar.  This effectively devalued the peso from four pesos to the dollar to 7.2 pesos to the dollar in one week’s time.  The U.S. government began buying pesos in an attempt to stop a collapse, and then put forth $50 billion in loan guarantees to Mexico, which were accepted and repaid ahead of schedule by 1997.

“The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle”

The Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) was swept away by the Keynesian revolution in macroeconomics.  There were several reasons for this:  Keynesianism did away with the mathematically intractable and complicated Austrian capital theory, opening up macroeconomic analysis to systems of equations and graphs which were easily solved and understood.   Much of the economy was reduced to incomes and expenditures and the psychological factors which have a hand in driving them.  Such ease of exposition led to perhaps the most important reason for the Keynesian system’s success:  it told politicians that what was needed of them was what they already desired to do, which is lead the economy through spending, easy credit, and manipulation of the money supply.

An understanding of Keynesianism is necessary to understand the government’s actions in the economy, but it is not sufficient to understand the results of these actions.  For this we need a richer theory which does not shy away from the difficulties of capital theory and intertemporal economic coordination.  What is lost in mathematical precision will be more than gained in an understanding of the distortions caused by economic intervention.

“The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle” provides an overview of Austrian business cycle theory with essays from Ludwig von Mises, Gottfried Haberler, Friedrich Hayek, and Murray Rothbard, and an introduction and a final summary by Roger Garrison, a leading Austrian macroeconomic theorist today.

Ludwig von Mises’ “The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle” (1936)

Mises starts his essay with a description of the English Currency School’s (ECS) theory of trade cycles.  The ECS’s theory focuses on unbacked credit expansion through bank notes, but neglects the similar problems caused by the existence of bank current accounts which can be drawn on at any time.  The ECS favored legislation restricting unbacked bank notes, which they got with Peel’s Bank Act of 1844.  This law, which left unbacked current accounts unhindered, failed to stem future crises and wrongly led to a discrediting of monetary theories of trade cycles.

The ECS also analyzed the effects of credit expansion in one country only, where its trading partners maintained tight credit policies.  While useful, this needlessly restricts the theory to foreign trade effects, leaving the situation of simultaneous credit expansion among many countries out of the analysis.  The theory goes like this:  easy credit leads to rising domestic prices, causing imports to rise and exports to fall.  Metallic money flows out of the country, domestic banks must repay the unbacked notes they have issued, causing them to restrict credit, which together with the outflow of metallic money causes domestic prices to fall.

Mises now proposes a theory with some similarity to the ECS, but without its limitations.  Here, unbacked bank notes and current accounts, known as fiduciary media, allow banks to extend credit far beyond their assets and deposits.  This lowers the money rate of interest below the natural rate, so the “hurdle rate” for business projects falls and more activity begins, with an increase in the demand for and price of capital goods and labor.  Consumer goods prices then rise, signalling businesses to start more projects, which must also be financed with unbacked bank credit.

Capital goods and labor have, however not increased in quantity, so the increased activity must divert these resources away from activities which would have otherwise gone on in the absence of credit expansion.  This means that consumer demand and business production have diverged during this credit induced boom.

As people begin to accept that money inflation and rising prices will continue, they quickly begin to exchange their money for goods as an inflation hedge.  Commodity prices rise as the currency’s exchange value falls, and the boom accelerates.  Even though nominal interest rates are rising at this time, due to inflation, real rates are not high enough to slow the boom phase.

If at this point the banks decrease the availability of credit in order to avert a currency collapse and to stop the boom, then the bad investments undertaken in the easy credit environment will be exposed and will be halted or liquidated, causing prices to crash and a depression to follow.  As credit is restricted, interest rates rise as the economy is braked, then fall during the depression, but are ineffective in stimulating the economy.  Cash reserves held by fearful banks, businesses, and individuals grow as the depression continues.

Wages rose rapidly during the boom phase and should fall now with the prices of the other factors of production in nominal and real terms.  The trade unions, however, prevent this natural equilibrating process, extending unemployment by pricing labor out of the current market and preventing a natural fall in goods prices in accordance with the new, smaller money supply.

The banks face a decision of when to restrict credit to end the unsustainable boom.  The longer it continues, the more bad investments take place, and the longer the period of adjustment and depression will be that follows.  It is often suggested that the economy should be “stimulated” at this time by lowering interest rates, which can only temporarily relieve the current conditions but will cause worse problems in the future.  The pain during the readjustment period cannot be avoided.

Inflation and Capital Consumption

Inflation has many negative, often unnoticed, consequences for an economy.  This is one example from Rothbard’s Chapter 12, which deals with credit expansion and business cycles, of Man, Economy, and State.  Businesses can unknowingly consume their capital in an inflationary environment.  Capital goods purchases are recorded at cost.  When finished goods are sold later, they are recorded with an inflationary gain.  The seemingly profitable business might consume the profits they believe have been earned above what they need for capital replacement.  However, when it comes time to replace the capital, it will also be inflated and the business will realize that its profits were illusory, and it had unwittingly been consuming its capital.

The recent housing boom provides a good example of capital consumption.  Home prices soared, causing American homeowners to feel wealthier.  They used this wealth to finance purchases of consumption goods, much of them imported.  When housing prices fell, people realized they had been fooled by the effects of monetary inflation on the housing markets and had been consuming capital all along.

This illustrates the importance of capital theory in any understanding of the way manipulations of the supply of money and credit can cause relative distortions in the capital structure.  In a world free of government and bank credit manipulation, the capital structure would be arrayed in conformity to society’s time preferences, where any investment would have to be financed through saving, which means putting off consumption now for more consumption in the future.  The ratio of the price of current goods and future goods provides the natural rate of interest and is a direct result of the collective time preferences of consumers, savers, and investors.

When interest rates and the supply of money are manipulated, people are fooled into thinking that they are richer and can afford to spend more when their assets rise in value, when in reality they are increasing their time preference by consuming their capital.  This is the economic boom period.  The bust follows when assets must be liquidated in order to finance the increased consumption brought on by the illusion of prosperity.