The Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) was swept away by the Keynesian revolution in macroeconomics. There were several reasons for this: Keynesianism did away with the mathematically intractable and complicated Austrian capital theory, opening up macroeconomic analysis to systems of equations and graphs which were easily solved and understood. Much of the economy was reduced to incomes and expenditures and the psychological factors which have a hand in driving them. Such ease of exposition led to perhaps the most important reason for the Keynesian system’s success: it told politicians that what was needed of them was what they already desired to do, which is lead the economy through spending, easy credit, and manipulation of the money supply.
An understanding of Keynesianism is necessary to understand the government’s actions in the economy, but it is not sufficient to understand the results of these actions. For this we need a richer theory which does not shy away from the difficulties of capital theory and intertemporal economic coordination. What is lost in mathematical precision will be more than gained in an understanding of the distortions caused by economic intervention.
“The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle” provides an overview of Austrian business cycle theory with essays from Ludwig von Mises, Gottfried Haberler, Friedrich Hayek, and Murray Rothbard, and an introduction and a final summary by Roger Garrison, a leading Austrian macroeconomic theorist today.
Ludwig von Mises’ “The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle” (1936)
Mises starts his essay with a description of the English Currency School’s (ECS) theory of trade cycles. The ECS’s theory focuses on unbacked credit expansion through bank notes, but neglects the similar problems caused by the existence of bank current accounts which can be drawn on at any time. The ECS favored legislation restricting unbacked bank notes, which they got with Peel’s Bank Act of 1844. This law, which left unbacked current accounts unhindered, failed to stem future crises and wrongly led to a discrediting of monetary theories of trade cycles.
The ECS also analyzed the effects of credit expansion in one country only, where its trading partners maintained tight credit policies. While useful, this needlessly restricts the theory to foreign trade effects, leaving the situation of simultaneous credit expansion among many countries out of the analysis. The theory goes like this: easy credit leads to rising domestic prices, causing imports to rise and exports to fall. Metallic money flows out of the country, domestic banks must repay the unbacked notes they have issued, causing them to restrict credit, which together with the outflow of metallic money causes domestic prices to fall.
Mises now proposes a theory with some similarity to the ECS, but without its limitations. Here, unbacked bank notes and current accounts, known as fiduciary media, allow banks to extend credit far beyond their assets and deposits. This lowers the money rate of interest below the natural rate, so the “hurdle rate” for business projects falls and more activity begins, with an increase in the demand for and price of capital goods and labor. Consumer goods prices then rise, signalling businesses to start more projects, which must also be financed with unbacked bank credit.
Capital goods and labor have, however not increased in quantity, so the increased activity must divert these resources away from activities which would have otherwise gone on in the absence of credit expansion. This means that consumer demand and business production have diverged during this credit induced boom.
As people begin to accept that money inflation and rising prices will continue, they quickly begin to exchange their money for goods as an inflation hedge. Commodity prices rise as the currency’s exchange value falls, and the boom accelerates. Even though nominal interest rates are rising at this time, due to inflation, real rates are not high enough to slow the boom phase.
If at this point the banks decrease the availability of credit in order to avert a currency collapse and to stop the boom, then the bad investments undertaken in the easy credit environment will be exposed and will be halted or liquidated, causing prices to crash and a depression to follow. As credit is restricted, interest rates rise as the economy is braked, then fall during the depression, but are ineffective in stimulating the economy. Cash reserves held by fearful banks, businesses, and individuals grow as the depression continues.
Wages rose rapidly during the boom phase and should fall now with the prices of the other factors of production in nominal and real terms. The trade unions, however, prevent this natural equilibrating process, extending unemployment by pricing labor out of the current market and preventing a natural fall in goods prices in accordance with the new, smaller money supply.
The banks face a decision of when to restrict credit to end the unsustainable boom. The longer it continues, the more bad investments take place, and the longer the period of adjustment and depression will be that follows. It is often suggested that the economy should be “stimulated” at this time by lowering interest rates, which can only temporarily relieve the current conditions but will cause worse problems in the future. The pain during the readjustment period cannot be avoided.